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Abstract 
The microcredit programs have expanded rapidly in Bangladesh in recent times. A recent 
phenomenon is that a large number of small and localized micro-finance institutions are 
operating side by side with established national-level institutions in the local-level 
microfinance markets. Here we examine the recent data from the Pathrail union of the 
Tangail district, one of the old places of microcredit, and we find interesting features 
regarding entry and operations of microcredit activities. One clear finding is that large 
and small micro-finance institutions tend to choose economically more prospective 
locations as their choices of destinations and in turn do have a tendency to ignore 
economically less prospective regions. We specify a panel data probit regression 
framework and the results derived are consistent with our casual observations of the data.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The microfinance industry in Bangladesh has expanded rapidly in recent years. With a 
background of four decades of experiences already by this time, this industry has gained 
a worldwide reputation in targeted poverty alleviation initiatives, skill development and 
training, entrepreneurial development, etc. As an indication of the scale of this industry, 
we can cite Microcredit Regulatory Authority (2008) that a total number of 4236 NGO-
MFIs had applied to MRA by 2006 for obtaining obligatory license to run microcredit 
activities in the country. Interestingly there are wide variations within these MFIs, 
whereas a few of these MFIs are truly gigantic in size, such as serving more than one 
million borrowers; on the other hand, there is a large number of MFIs who operate only a 
few offices and have borrowers not more than one thousand. One question that emerges 
is that how do firms with quite large differences in size and financial strength exist side 
by side in this microfinance market. What are the factors that a large MFI firm takes into 
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consideration while deciding to enter a locality? The same question can be asked about 
the small MFI firms as well.    
Section 2: Background and Motivation 
The location decision by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have a host of implications for 
the microfinance industry in general. By ‘location decision’ we mean a lender’s choice to 
place its business in a village as opposed to others. Microfinance institutions, primarily in 
the business of extending microcredit loans and generating micro savings, can loosely be 
divided into two types, namely, for profit and not for profit MFIs (Cull, Kunt and 
Morduch (2009)). The not for profit MFIs do not necessarily mean that their revenue is 
less than operational costs. The difference lies with the source of capital, which is social 
capital based and the profit earning is primarily due to keeping the program sustainable. 
Understanding of location decisions in the midst of operation by both of these types of 
organizations, more accurately in the face of increasing competition between these 
microlenders is of paramount importance. The importance lies with plausible 
implications that these decisions can bring about. Before that, we need a clear 
understanding of the discernible factors that keep the system sustainable. 
 Microcredit programs in Bangladesh started as a group based activity. How the 
group based activity as a strategy addresses the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problem has long been established (see de Aghion and Morduch (2005)). In the last two 
decades, however, microcredit activities and even the Grameen Bank (GB) which 
purports to be the inventor and the pioneer of group-based activity have shifted away 
from sticking to it while extending loans. It was realized that the dynamic incentive to get 
a loan in future serves the purpose of addressing any moral hazard problem in repaying 
loans. To maintain the cash-flow, recurrence of investment or expansion of income 
generating activities keeps the need for loan ever important to the borrowers. Simply to 
ensure access to future loan a borrower keeps away from default.  
 The dynamic incentive may, however, weaken in face of competition (see de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005)). The key factor here is the information regarding previous 
repayment status of the borrowers. If it is part of common knowledge that poor 
repayment or default history of a borrower is inaccessible to lenders then it is plausible 
that some borrowers may create moral hazard problem and shirk on repayment. 
Competition among the lenders brings options for the borrowers. If one lender refuses to 
extend new loan as a response to poor repayment by a borrower then the borrower can 
move to someone else. The possibility of weakened dynamic incentive, if perceived as 
important by the lenders, can play a role in location decision of the MFIs. The MFIs may 
therefore try to skip locations where are too high a competition in the microcredit market. 
On the other hand, each of the MFIs needs to decide whether to locate their program in a 
specific location or not. On that account, an MFI may observe other competing firm’s 
decision. Economically prosperous areas are lucrative locations for microcredit, for that 
matter, any credit operation. This way MFIs have strong reasons to disburse their 
resource in economically prosperous areas, on the other hand since these same locations 
typically may have a higher degree of competition in the market this may reduce the 
dynamic incentive on the part of the borrowers so vital for successful microcredit 
operations. We note that some other factors may also play their respective roles. 
McIntosh et. al. (2005), for example, found that district characteristics suggestive of 
higher existing lending activities are factors driving micro-credit organizations in Uganda 
to locate themselves in such places. 
 Another interesting feature of this location decision is the aspect, the decision is 
by whom? A relevant issue is that how costly is it to enter a local microcredit market? 
What constitutes a situation when an MFI considers the earlier decision of entering a 
locality a successful one or an unsuccessful one? Surely future implications are taken into 
consideration when an MFI takes a decision provided the decision itself is an expensive 
one.  While a large MFI may find it easier to experiment with a new locality a small MFI 
may not find it that easy on financial grounds. An important part of this issue can be that 
large MFIs may have different situations and perspectives as compared to the small 
MFIs. It is also possible that while a large MFI may not have to bother about if a small 
MFI already exists in the locality that it wants to enter-- the same may not apply to a 
small MFI. The latter may have reasons to bother if there are strong incumbent firms 
already in the local market.  
  The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 is the introduction whereas 
Section 2 is the background and motivation. Section 3 specifies the research question. 
Section 4 discusses the overview of the literature. Section 5 discusses the data and 
analyzes the data, while Section 6 discusses an econometric analysis. And finally, Section 
7 concludes.  
Section 3: Research Question 
The objective of the paper is to examine the location and continued operation decision of 
microfinance institutions in specific areas, and their determinants.  The paper examines the data 
collected from a locality which has a long record of microfinance activities in the background, 
and investigates the way the entry decision is made, taking into consideration population and 
physical characteristics of the locality, characteristics of the NGO-MFI itself, level of activeness 
of the microfinance market, etc.  
 
Section 4: Overview of Literature 
The only existing literature that deals with the placement decisions of the MFIs, is 
McIntosh C. et. al. (2005). The paper is mainly about borrowers’ responses in presence of 
competition among lenders, but the paper in a segment also deals with the question of 
placement determinants for the lending organizations in Uganda.  
The microfinance activities in Uganda gained momentum in the nineties and by 
the end of that decade the lending organizations found themselves in a competitive 
situation; they extended their activity more in overlapping regions. The authors wanted to 
find how the group members of FINCA, a large widely spread MFI in Uganda, responded 
in the face of multiple borrowing options due to the presence of other MFIs in proximity. 
The FINCA in their conduct of credit activities faced competition from Village Banks 
(VB), Solidarity Groups (SG) and Individual lenders. VB and SG provide loans to groups 
of people and uses joint liability as a way to address the moral hazard problem. The 
group sizes of VB borrowers are larger than those of SG. Village banks are not the same 
as solidarity groups; they provide collateral-free loans, depend less on the individual 
screening of the borrowers compared to SG and provide the least size loans among the 
three. The individual lenders, on the other hand, provide loans to individuals only. They 
provide collateralized loans, follows the rigorous screening and charges high-interest 
rates and their loans’ sizes are the largest of all. So in all respect SG are in between the 
VB and the individual lenders in the dimensions mentioned. FINCA faces competition in 
the micro-credit market in Uganda from all three types of lenders. The paper constructs a 
subjective definition of competition whereby it is defined as the presence, number or 
distance of the other lending organizations from the group activities of FINCA. The paper 
estimates the change in the number of lending organizations near FINCA groups in 
between 1998 through 2001 as the change in the level of competition faced by FINCA as 
a function of group and district characteristics. The group characteristics include the 
presence of commercial banks and whether the FINCA group is rural or urban. The 
district characteristics include average level of education of the groups in a district, MFI 
penetration in the district, the proportion of the population having access to bank account, 
among others as the district level explanatory variables. The paper found that in their 
location decision MFIs do respond to district level characteristics. MFIs tend to locate in 
places with a higher level of existing lending activities both by commercial banks and 
micro-credit institutions and tend to locate more in rural districts.  
This result suggests that MFIs in Uganda tend to locate in places of higher 
economic activity and the level of maturity in micro-credit activity is also important in 
their placement decisions. 
The current paper is an addition to this line of investigation where we look into 
village level characteristics as potential determining factors of MFI activities in 
Bangladesh.     
Section 5: Data 
5.1 Data from the Pathrail union, Tangail 
Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation (PKSF) and Institute of Microfinance (InM) jointly conducted 
a census of microcredit borrowers at Pathrail union in Delduar upazila (sub-district) of Tangail 
district in the months of March and April in 2007-- the objective of the census was to examine 
overlapping pattern among the microcredit borrowers. There was a specific reason why the 
borrower census survey was conducted in the Tangail district. This district is one of the earliest 
locations of microcredit operation in Bangladesh where the program started as early as in the late 
1970s. We, therefore, expect that the local microcredit market has taken a matured shape by this 
time. Examination of data from here, therefore, would provide valuable insights into the 
functioning of this market more specifically our own queries (see Mahmoud, Khalily and 
Wadood (2009)). 
 
5.2 Structure of Data 
We analyze data from the PKSF-InM jointly conducted census of Pathrail union microcredit 
borrowers. We note that Pathrail union has a total of 23 villages, of different population sizes. 
The census had four modules of the questionnaire. The first module is administered for every 
single household in the union for listing purposes, asking basic information with regards to 
landholding, NGO-MFI membership status, etc. (Module 1: listing questionnaire). The second 
module is a village survey questionnaire, administered in focus group discussions held in each 
village in order to reach a consensus opinion-- questions were mostly on physical infrastructure of 
the villages and distance from important locations, e.g., paved road, post office, union parishad 
headquarters, upazila parishad headquarters, school, bank, college, health center, bazaar, etc. 
(Module 2: village questionnaire). The third module is administered among branch managers and 
field workers of NGO-MFIs-- questions mostly on the issues of competition practices of MFIs 
and overlapping situation (Module 3: NGO-MFI questionnaire). The fourth module was a 
detailed household questionnaire, only for households who are members and/or borrowers of 
NGO-MFIs (Module 4: household questionnaire). A total of 4,496 household interviews were 
recorded with Module 4.   
This fourth module includes a listing of all NGO-MFIs and loan types that household 
members have taken a loan from since inception of microcredit in this area in 1979. For every 
single NGO-MFI loan taken by the household, the questionnaire records details of loan amount 
demanded, loan amount disbursed, the purpose of the loan, utilization of loan, date of loan 
sanctioning, the name of MFI-NGO from which loan has been taken, etc. Since Module 4 has 
NGO-MFI loan history of all the households in the village who ever participated in the 
microcredit market-- it is possible to construct a village-level panel data set from combining 
household information up to the village level. Since concerns may arise regarding the correctness 
of long recall, we analyzed the data only within a specific time frame-- years 2000 to 2006 
(household interviews were conducted on March-April of 2007, so this year was yet to get 
completed, therefore we did not include this year in our analysis).  
The list from Module 4 includes formal sources such as banks and MFIs and informal sources 
such as commercial money lenders, neighbours and rich farmers in the village. We selected a 
total of 43 NGO-MFIs from among 65 numbers of sources of credit funds for household (not 
selected are categories outside the scope of microcredit market). We classified MFIs in two size 
categories: “large” and “small”. We consulted PKSF documents for years 2000 to 2006 to 
ascertain which MFI would be placed in which category. We placed 8 MFIs as “large” ones 
(namely BRAC, ASA, Proshika, Grameen Bank, BRDB, PDBF, SSS and BURO Tangail) and the 
remaining 35 MFIs as “small” ones (these did not receive funds from PKSF till then, and 
typically these were small in size and local in terms of microcredit operations). We defined 
“market share of borrowers” as the share of the village microcredit borrowers that went to a 
particular MFI in a given year. Combining all the market shares of a particular MFI across all the 
villages in terms of borrowers and loan amount disbursed, we have conducted the Herfindahl 
index for microfinance market of borrowers for each village in each year.  
 In order to understand the location decision, we have constructed a dummy variable 
yes/no (value of 1 if the MFI operates in the village in that particular year and 0 if otherwise). As 
we have 23 villages, 43 NGOs and 7 years of information (from 2000 to 2006), we have 
constructed a balanced panel dataset of the short time length of 6923 data points. An important 
variable that is useful is avglndisb, average loan disbursed by NGOs in the villages in a particular 
year. A one year lagged variable avglndisblag1 was also useful in econometric analysis.  We have 
also examined average nominal interest rates charged by MFIs, the percentage of loans for 
handloom categories in the MFI loan disbursement portfolio, etc. 
 
5.3 Analysis of Data 
 
All village discussion 
Pathrail union has 23 villages. Villages are not similar in importance and in terms 
of the scale of economic activities. Factors such as differences in size of population, 
remoteness of placement from near city centers, backwardness in infrastructure 
(roadways, electricity, access to energy and clean water etc.), more proneness to natural 
disasters (river erosion, flood etc.) can cause MFIs to rank villages in terms of being 
lucrative places for loan extension. If MFIs were solely guided by the aim of reducing 
poverty and therefore targeting vulnerable people then many of the factors mentioned 
above would not matter to distinguish between households. In reality, the buoyancy of 
economic activity of a place can matter for MFIs.  
 
 
 
 Table 1 Physical and Market Characteristics of Survey Villages in Pathrail union 
2006
village borrmem pctuseelecdispakarastadisunionparishadd upzsadardisbank disbazar
Nolshuda 286 90 0.5 0.5 6.5 0.5 4
Shuvki 303 96 0 2.5 8 2.5 4
Bishnupur 138 90 0 2 7 2 4
Tarini 365 70 0.25 2 4 3 6
Bakultola 53 70 0.05 6 15 9 10
Arra 23 85 2 3 3 3 13
Narunda 471 85 0.25 3 9 3 4
Deojan 490 80 0 0.25 6 0.25 0.25
Borotia 215 90 1 2.5 12 2.5 1.5
Kumuria 164 80 1 5 10 5 1
Gadtola 114 92 0.75 1.5 5.5 1.25 1
Bandabari 108 40 0 4 10 4 2.5
Parijatpur 127 75 1 4 9 4 9
Chandi 408 70 0 0.5 7 0.5 4
Doshokia 156 70 0.5 3 8 3 8
Chinakhola 247 80 0.5 1 4 1.5 1
Ar-Alea 40 98 0.25 4 10 2.5 6
Akondopara 84 99 0.125 3 12 3 4
Paikpara 65 90 2 2 12 2 3
Koijuri 247 80 0 2 9 2 3
Gopalpur 137 75 1 1.5 7 1.5 1.5
Pathrail 1030 95 0 0 6 0 5
Mongolhor 500 90 0 1.5 7 1 1  
Source: Mahmoud, Khalily and Wadood (2009) 
The MFIs are not homogeneous in terms of their goal and strategies in pursuing their 
business. Some of them incorporate more importance to the target of poverty alleviation, 
whereas others can be mostly profit oriented. Still for both a common tendency can be to 
place themselves near centres of economic activity putting less importance to villages in 
remote areas. The reason is that at such a place an MFI can find more potential customers 
who albeit being poor are relatively less likely to default. Trades are found to be higher in 
scale, and traders in higher numbers, around places of higher economic activity. 
Therefore, villages which are near the district union parishad or near to large markets 
may enjoy a higher level of MFI participation than other villages away from such centres.  
 In order to facilitate the discussion, we classify the villages into three size 
distributions: small, medium and large. ‘Small’ villages are those with a number of 
borrowing member household less than 100, ‘medium’ villages have this number in 
between 100 and 300, and ‘large’ are those that exceed 300. According to this 
classification, we have here 7 small villages, 11 medium villages and 5 large villages (see 
Table 1). We, therefore, have two classifications to facilitate the discussions: a set of two 
categories “large” and “small” for NGO-MFIs, and a set of three categories “large” 
“medium” and “small” for villages.  
The existence of overlapping and its extent can play an important role for MFIs to 
make their placement decisions. Depending on differences in aims, a commensurate 
policy can cause different MFIs to take opposite decision with regard to their placements. 
Overlapping may bring different signals to different types of MFIs. If an NGO is social 
capital based, non-profit and driven by the sole aim of poverty alleviation then its target 
would be to extend credits to maximize the number of households served. Selecting most 
profitable members is likely to bear relatively less importance to it due to its aim of 
alleviation of poverty. A local, small and profit-oriented MFI may, however, prefer 
households who are relatively better off. To such an MFI a trader who has just started a 
small business is less important than a trader who has successfully gone through a 
number of times of loan receipt and repayment and their by increased his scale of 
business and therefore, also have become less vulnerable to fail and default. If 
overlapping is caused by insufficient capital from one source of fund to meet investment 
demand to reach higher scale or higher productive activity, then the latter type of MFI 
would prefer to engage in such villages. The profit motive, however, does not need to be 
specific to the small ones, it is quite possible, in fact, likely that large MFIs are also 
driven by it. Matin (undated) observed that a common claim of the small MFIs in his 
study area was that large MFIs pursued predatory strategies and engaged in overlapping.   
Table 2 exhibits names of all the NGO-MFIs who operated in Pathrail union in 
between 2000 and 2006. A number of MFIs mostly national-level and large in size 
measurements were already running their operations in 2000. In fact, Grameen Bank 
introduced its credit activity in 1979 in Pathrail union from one village, which by now 
covers all 23 villages in the union.3 But a new trend and major proliferation occurred 
from around the end of the last decade and continued till 2007 when the survey was 
conducted; during this period a large number of new and small-sized MFIs started their 
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operations in different villages.4 Some of these MFIs had much faster expansion than 
others. For example, ASA a leading MFI in Bangladesh was operating in only four 
villages in 2000 and increased their operations in 18 villages by 2006. Similar trends are 
observed for relatively small MFIs too. JOJONA and NIRAPAD SAMAJ expanded their 
loan operations from only four and one villages, respectively to 13 and nine villages, 
respectively in between the same period as ASA. SRABONTI did not have any existence 
as a micro-credit provider and only started in 2002 and by the period of the current 
survey, it cast its network in 13 villages. Contrast to this rapid expansion across villages, 
incumbent firms in 2000 were largely expanding only gradually to previously uncovered 
villages. A number of factors may have played a decisive role in leading to such 
development. For one thing, through gradual expansion of microfinance activity, many 
other places have become saturated and causing new entrants to flock to same places. The 
fund availability for microfinance operations has also increased due to government’s 
active initiatives; the markets have also become mature and by now people are familiar 
enough about costs and benefits of micro-credit borrowing and also the business 
opportunity of such activity has also triggered many to get into the lending business. One 
important aspect and interesting question to ponder over is in their expansion path where 
do the MFIs prefer to locate first. Is it the cases that MFIs, large and small, see all 
villages with the same interest or do they discriminate among them? Answers to this 
question depend on the motive of the MFIs, are they purely profit-oriented or poverty 
alleviation is the main goal pursued. We have no way to observe their motives but we can 
look into the determining factors of placement decisions of MFIs and on the basis of that 
may get closer to the answers to the question posed. We believe that to address this 
question, PKSF-InM overlapping data set of 2007 is most suited.  
 Although convenient as an introduction, the all village combined discussion fails 
to reach the heart of the issue (this includes our analysis up till Table 2). Up till now what 
we have discussed is only some distance measurement of villages and operation records 
of NGO-MFIs. In order to examine the issue more thoroughly, we need to see detail in 
the village as well as the NGO-MFI entry and operations records.  
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Table 2. Operations of NGO-MFIs in number of villages in Pathrail union, 2000-2006 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SSS Incumbent 16 16 18 18 19 20 20 
SATU Incumbent 16 18 19 21 21 21 21 
DORP Entrant 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ASA Incumbent 4 6 11 13 16 17 18 
BRAC Incumbent 15 15 18 19 20 22 22 
Grameen Bank Incumbent 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 
PROSHIKA Incumbent 4 4 3 5 5 8 8 
BRDB Incumbent 8 9 11 13 14 15 15 
PDBF Incumbent 2 1 2 1 3 3 7 
AGAMI UNNAYAN SOCIETY Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BURO TANGAIL Incumbent 20 20 22 23 23 23 23 
PAD Entrant 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
SONALY VOBESSOT Incumbent 1 0 2 1 2 3 3 
SUCHONA Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ONUKUL Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ONORD Entrant 0 0 2 3 6 6 5 
SHEBA ARTHO Incumbent 1 2 1 3 5 8 8 
SHEKOR Entrant 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
ANANDA Incumbent 2 4 4 4 5 5 6 
PROFULLO Entrant 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 
CHIRUTSHREE Entrant 0 0 0 0 2 6 5 
JOJONA Incumbent 4 5 8 11 12 13 13 
NIRAPOD SOMAJ Incumbent 1 1 1 1 1 2 9 
SAMAJIK DAYITTO Incumbent 1 0 2 2 2 4 4 
NOTUN SATHI Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
SPD Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SRABONTI Entrant 0 0 1 4 6 7 13 
SOBUJ CHATA Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
SHANTI UNNAYAN Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
ANANTA Entrant 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
SHAMAJIK SHEBA Incumbent 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 
DELDUAR UPAKENDRO Entrant 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
TOMA Entrant 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
POROSH Entrant 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 
MAUSH Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
USHA Incumbent 4 3 4 3 5 5 6 
AGRONI SOMAJ  Entrant 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
TAT SHILPI KALYAN Entrant 0 0 1 3 2 4 6 
BESHDO Entrant 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
UNNMESH Entrant 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 
BRISTI Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SOMONNITO UNNAYAN Entrant 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
SHUCHI O ECONOMIC BANKING Entrant 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Source: Pathrail Census (2007); Note: Pale Blue: Incumbent in 2000, Sky Blue: Entry 
 
Entry and Operations Records of NGO-MFIs 
In this section, we examine the entry and operations records of MGO-MFIs. As specific 
examples out of total 43 NGOs, we have selected four of them, two from the large MFI 
categories, and two others from the small MFI categories.  
 In Table 3 we see the records of a large national-level MFI: SSS. We note that in the 
Pathrail data set the principal emphasis was on the household questionnaire interview of 
borrower households. The major strength of the Pathrail data is that it covered every single client 
of the local microcredit market thus it is possible to construct the entire village market supply 
information from aggregating demand-side information at the household level. We know from 
our constructed information records that SSS had a strong presence in the union-level 
microcredit market. Most of the villages have seen activities of SSS way back in the 1990s. Most 
probably fund for further expansion into this area was not much of a problem for a large MFI 
like SSS, therefore, we see not much selection is being applied in the location decision. Yet we 
notice that while SSS as a much covered all ‘large’ villages (with borrowed member size to be 
above 300 by the year 2006), it did not feel much obligated to cover smaller villages with the 
same level of urgency. Even there are some small villages (in terms of potential borrowed 
member number) which have been ignored by SSS till 2006. A plausible explanation could be 
that SSS local administration did not consider these ‘small’ locations worthwhile in terms of 
resource expenditure, so to speak to bring only selected number of members under its umbrella. 
Although this is simply a case discussion we may think that one explanation for this lack of 
enthusiasm for the small market is the need for spending some minimum aggregate cost to enter 
into them which may not be economically interesting for MFIs even in the absence of fund 
constraints.  
Table 3. Entry and operations record of a large NGO-MFI: SSS 
ago name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
name village village frsyrop year year year year year year 
SSS Narunda large 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(large Deojan large 1992 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ngo) Chandi large 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Pathrail large 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Mongolhor large 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Nolshuda medium 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Shuvki medium 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Bishnupur medium 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Tarini medium 1985 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Borotia medium 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Kumuria medium 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Gadtola medium 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Doshokia medium 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Chinakhola medium 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Koijuri medium 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Gopalpur medium 1993 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Bakultola small 
      
  
 
Arra small 
      
  
 
Bandabari small 
     
2005 2006 
 
Parijatpur small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
 
Ar-Alea small 
      
  
 
Akondopara small 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Paikpara small 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
In Table 4 we have the record of a large national-level NGO-MFI: ASA. It has a 
more varied record in the sense that it has entered the villages in a scattered fashion 
within the framework of a number of years. The pattern is such that as if ASA had 
chalked out detailed plans of which of the villages that it would need to bring into its 
cover in which of the years. The expansion was gradual; it did not happen that all villages 
were targeted at the same time. Even though this looks scattered at the beginning, we still 
notice that there is a systematic pattern that is noticeable: all large villages have been 
covered, but expansion has not yet been done to include all medium and small category 
villages. 
Table 4. Entry and operations record of a large NGO-MFI: ASA 
ago name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
name village village frsyrop year year year year year year 
ASA Narunda large       2003 2004 2005 2006 
(large  Deojan large 
     
2005 2006 
ngo) Chandi large 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Pathrail large 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Mongolhor large 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Nolshuda medium 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Shuvki medium 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Bishnupur medium 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Tarini medium 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  Borotia medium 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Kumuria medium 
      
2006 
  Gadtola medium 
      
  
  Doshokia medium 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Chinakhola medium 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  Koijuri medium 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Gopalpur medium 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Bakultola small 
      
  
  Arra small 
      
  
  Bandabari small 
      
  
  Parijatpur small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  Ar-Alea small 
      
  
  Akondopara small 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Paikpara small     2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
In Table 5 we examine the entry and operations records of a small NGO: Shamajik 
Sheba. Similarly to ASA, Shamajik Sheba has entered the Pathrail union villages in a 
sporadic fashion. Still, we notice that this NGO has made sure that large villages are 
covered while it could wait on medium and small villages. We note that we do not have 
any internal information specific to the NGO, such as cost and output, or revenue 
assessment. This hinders to have a clear-cut assessment of the NGO’s decision regarding 
entering a village or continuing operation in that village. Nonetheless, the entry record 
that has been constructed here gives us a useful idea of how the firms tend to spread their 
operations over time. 
Table 5. Entry and operations record of a small NGO-MFI: Shamajik Sheba 
ago name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
name village village frsyrop year year year year year year 
SHAMAJIK Narunda large 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SHEBA Deojan large 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(small Chandi large 
  
2002 
 
2004 2005 2006 
ngo) Pathrail large 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Mongolhor large 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Nolshuda medium 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Shuvki medium 
      
2006 
  Bishnupur medium 
      
  
  Tarini medium 
      
  
  Borotia medium 
     
2005 2006 
  Kumuria medium 
      
  
  Gadtola medium 2000 2001 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Doshokia medium 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  Chinakhola medium 
      
  
  Koijuri medium 
     
2005 2006 
  Gopalpur medium 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
2006 
  Bakultola small 
      
  
  Arra small 
      
  
  Bandabari small 
      
  
  Parijatpur small 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Ar-Alea small 
      
  
  Akondopara small 
      
  
  Paikpara small               
 
In Table 6 we have the entry and operations record of a small MFI: Jojona. Even though 
Jojona is not present in the national records we notice that it has a regular presence in the local 
level microcredit market. Jojona’s selection of villages indicates that it has given the large 
villages a priority over all others. Once it has already covered large villages, it has gradually 
expanded into medium and small villages.  
Table 6. Entry and operations record of a small NGO-MFI: Jojona 
ngo name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
name village village frsyrop year year year year year year 
JOJONA Narunda large       2003 2004 2005 2006 
(small  Deojan large 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ngo) Chandi large 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Pathrail large 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Mongolhor large 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Nolshuda medium 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Shuvki medium 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Bishnupur medium 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Tarini medium 
     
2005   
  Borotia medium 
      
  
  Kumuria medium 
      
  
  Gadtola medium 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  Doshokia medium 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Chinakhola medium 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Koijuri medium 
      
  
  Gopalpur medium 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Bakultola small 
      
  
  Arra small 
      
  
  Bandabari small 
      
  
  Parijatpur small 
      
  
  Ar-Alea small 
      
  
  Akondopara small 
      
2006 
  Paikpara small               
 
So far we have examined the records of NGO MFIs. As per the arbitrarily set 
classification of “large” and “small” MFIs, we notice that pattern of expansion for both types of 
MFIs is the same. Initially, the operation starts in one or two locations. After then the operations 
expand into other neighbouring locality. Irrespective of the MFI being large or small, the first 
selection is towards the ‘large” villages (economically more prospective locality) and maybe 
sometimes some “medium” villages. It does not happen that a large MFI has started out at a 
small village first, and then has moved on to larger locations later. Small MFIs, because of 
resource constraint, has to be more observing before making a move into a village. Yet we notice 
that small MFIs also prefer large villages to start their business.  
In the following sub-section, we will examine the record from another angle: from the 
point of view of the villages.  
Entry and Operations Records of NGO-MFIs: From Village Perspectives 
We examined records of MFI-NGOs operating in the villages in this sub-section. We have 
selected three villages for discussion; namely the village Narunda as a “large” village, the village 
Nolshuda as a “medium” village and the village Parijatpur as a “small” village.  
 A common feature of all three villages is that large MFIs tend to enter the village 
microcredit market early. In the case of the village Narunda, large MFIs entered mostly before 
2000 and small MFIs followed through after 2000. Alternatively, we can state that small MFIs 
have waited for a while before entering this large village. We do not find indications that small 
MFIs actively competed with large MFIs to enter this village. Within the village, we find that the 
average loan amount disbursed by large MFIs is higher than those by small MFIs and this 
statement is true for every year of the record. On the other hand, the records say that the average 
interest rates charged by the small MFIs are higher as compared to those charged by large MFIs.   
A slightly more interesting case occurs in the case of the village Nolshuda, which is a 
medium category village. We notice that small MFIs have competed more vigorously in this 
village compared to the case of the large village Narunda. Interestingly small MFIs have offered 
larger average loan amounts in some years whereas it is the large MFIs who typically provided 
the larger average loan amounts. In the case of the interest rates charged small MFIs have 
charged higher loan amounts.  
Finally, we examine the entry and operations records of a small village, Parijatpur. This 
is a small village in the sense that the potential market for microcredit is small. We do not find 
much activity in this market. Only the large MFIs have extended operations into this village, in 
addition to only a few small MFIs. In some of the years, average loan disbursed by small MFIs 
have exceeded that offered by the large MFIs. 
Table 7. Entry and Operations Record of a Large Village: Narunda 
  name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
village Ngo ago frsyrop year year year year year year 
Narunda SSS big 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(large  ASA big 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
village) BRAC big 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Grameen big 1981 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  PROSHIKA big 
      
  
  BRDB big 1980 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  PDBF big 
      
  
  BURO  big 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  SATU small 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DORP small 
      
  
  AGAMI U. small 
      
  
  PAD small 
      
  
  SONALY V. small 
      
  
  SUCHONA small 
      
  
  ONUKUL small 
      
  
  ONORD small 
    
2004 2005   
  SHEBA AR. small 
      
  
  SHEKOR small 
      
2006 
  ANANDA small 
      
  
  PROFULLO small 
      
  
  CHIRUTSHREE small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  JOJONA small 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  NIRAPOD S. small 
      
  
  SAMAJIK D. small 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  NOTUN SATHI small 
      
  
  SPD small 
      
  
  SRABONTI small 
      
2006 
  SOBUJ CHATA small 
      
  
  SHANTI UN. small 
      
  
  ANANTA small 
      
  
  SHAMAJIK SH. small 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DELDUAR UPA. small 
      
  
  TOMA small 
      
  
  POROSH small 
     
2005 2006 
  MAUSH small 
      
  
  USHA small 
      
  
  AGRONI SOMAJ  small 
      
  
  TAT SHILPI KAL. small 
      
  
  BESHDO small 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
  UNNMESH small 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  BRISTI small 
     
2005 2006 
  SOM. U. small 
      
  
  SHU. O ECO. small 
      
  
  avg. loan disb. all 5182 5973 6710 7470 8532 9530 11080 
  
 
large 5255 6099 6906 7600 8735 10068 11520 
  
 
small 4250 4917 5583 6630 7216 7307 9245 
  avg. interest rate all 13.58 13.83 14.79 15.38 15.36 15.21 15.18 
  
 
large 13.29 13.36 13.37 13.67 13.50 12.73 12.79 
    small 15.00 15.00 16.56 17.08 16.75 16.69 16.61 
 
 
 Table 8. Entry and Operations Record of a Medium Village: Nolshuda 
 
  name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
village Ngo ngo frsyrop year year year year year year 
Nolshuda SSS big 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(medium ASA big 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
village) BRAC big 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Grameen big 1980 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  PROSHIKA big 
     
2005 2006 
  BRDB big 
      
  
  PDBF big 
    
2004 
 
2006 
  BURO  big 1993 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  SATU small 1993 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DORP small 
      
  
  AGAMI U. small 
      
  
  PAD small 
      
  
  SONALY V. small 
      
  
  SUCHONA small 
      
  
  ONUKUL small 
      
  
  ONORD small 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  SHEBA AR. small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  SHEKOR small 
      
  
  ANANDA small 
      
  
  PROFULLO small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  CHIRUTSHREE small 
     
2005   
  JOJONA small 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  NIRAPOD S. small 
      
2006 
  SAMAJIK D. small 
      
  
  NOTUN SATHI small 
      
  
  SPD small 
      
  
  SRABONTI small 
   
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  SOBUJ CHATA small 
      
  
  SHANTI UN. small 
      
  
  ANANTA small 
      
  
  SHAMAJIK SH. small 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DELDUAR UPA. small 
      
  
  TOMA small 
      
  
  POROSH small 
      
  
  MAUSH small 
      
  
  USHA small 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  AGRONI SOMAJ  small 
      
  
  TAT SHILPI KAL. small 
   
2003 
 
2005 2006 
  BESHDO small 
      
  
  UNNMESH small 
    
2004 2005 2006 
  BRISTI small 
      
  
  SOM. U. small 
      
  
  SHU. O ECO. small 
      
  
  avg. loan disb. all 6297 8444 7593 8582 10025 11997 11287 
  
 
large 6469 9000 8526 9150 10476 11862 11376 
  
 
small 5200 6222 5375 7348 9027 12243 11121 
  avg. interest rate all 16.22 15.97 16.18 16.72 15.73 15.82 15.42 
  
 
large 15.02 15.14 14.92 14.79 14.35 13.50 13.51 
    small 18.20 17.37 17.76 18.33 16.76 17.08 16.63 
 
 
Table 9. Entry and Operations Record of a Small Village: Parijatpur 
 
  name of type of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
village ngo ngo frsyrop year year year year year year 
Parijatpur SSS big         2004 2005 2006 
(small ASA big 
    
2004 2005 2006 
village) BRAC big 1992 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Grameen big 1988 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  PROSHIKA big 1990 2001 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
  BRDB big 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  PDBF big 
      
  
  BURO  big 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  SATU small 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DORP small 
      
  
  AGAMI U. small 
      
  
  PAD small 
      
  
  SONALY V. small 
      
  
  SUCHONA small 
      
  
  ONUKUL small 
      
  
  ONORD small 
      
  
  SHEBA AR. small 
      
  
  SHEKOR small 
      
  
  ANANDA small 
      
  
  PROFULLO small 
      
  
  CHIRUTSHREE small 
      
  
  JOJONA small 
      
  
  NIRAPOD S. small 
      
  
  SAMAJIK D. small 
      
  
  NOTUN SATHI small 
      
  
  SPD small 
      
  
  SRABONTI small 
      
  
  SOBUJ CHATA small 
      
  
  SHANTI UN. small 
      
  
  ANANTA small 
      
  
  SHAMAJIK SH. small 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  DELDUAR UPA. small 
      
  
  TOMA small 
      
  
  POROSH small 
      
  
  MAUSH small 
      
  
  USHA small 
      
  
  AGRONI SOMAJ  small 
      
  
  TAT SHILPI KAL. small 
      
  
  BESHDO small 
      
  
  UNNMESH small 
      
  
  BRISTI small 
      
  
  SOM. U. small 
      
  
  SHU. O ECO. small 
      
  
  avg. loan disb. all 5607 6243 6738 6283 6244 7549 8976 
  
 
large 5870 6483 7059 6295 5931 7264 8353 
  
 
small 4400 5375 5375 6222 7857 9312 11520 
  avg. interest  all 14.64 14.53 14.51 14.55 13.91 13.48 13.15 
  rate large 14.00 13.96 13.87 13.93 13.60 13.04 12.61 
    small 16.25 15.98 15.78 16.12 15.00 15.00 15.03 
 
Section 6: Econometric Analysis 
 
Section 6.1 Economic Model 
We want to model the location decision of MFIs in the Pathrail union villages within the time 
frame of 2000 to 2006. We have constructed a data set for this purpose-- the range is in between 
2000 and 2006. The idea is based on the concept of a pair of identifications, one of a village and 
the other one of an MFI. Therefore the village i is combined with an MFI j, so the identification 
of the observation is (village i and MFI j). We have 43 MFIs, 23 villages and 7 years of 
information, so we have 6923 observations. As mentioned earlier, we have a variable “yesno”: 
each year if an MFI operates in a particular village, we have a value of one for this, otherwise, 
the value is zero.  
 
Table 10. Summary Information regarding the Variable “Yesno” 
Information regarding the variable “yesno”: 
In the year 2000, out of a total of 989 observations, 121 were “yes”, others were “no” (12.23%) 
In the year 2001, out of a total of 989 observations, 130 were “yes”, others were “no” (13.14%) 
In the year 2002, out of a total of 989 observations, 161 were “yes”, others were “no” (16.28%) 
In the year 2003, out of a total of 989 observations, 174 were “yes”, others were “no” (17.59%) 
In the year 2004, out of a total of 989 observations, 208 were “yes”, others were “no” (21.03%)  
In the year 2005, out of a total of 989 observations, 240 were “yes”, others were “no” (24.27%) 
In the year 2006, out of a total of 989 observations, 273 were “yes”, others were “no” (27.60%) 
 
We notice that every year the probability of the presence of MFIs is increasing. One explanation 
could be that microfinance operations once started have a tendency to reinforce themselves over 
the following years. As for example, first, some potential client becomes the member of the MFI. 
The following year the client expects some amount of loan to be disbursed. Upon satisfactory 
performance on the earlier loan, the member now expects a larger amount of loan the following 
year. Therefore the tendency of a typical microfinance operation is that once started in a locality 
it will exhibit a tendency to grow over time.   
 
 
Table 11. Further Breakdown of Information on Variable “Yesno” by Year and Village Type 
 
Tab   Village Type     
Operate or Not Small Medium Large Total 
2000 
(Yes=1)   24 7.97 61 12.90 36 16.74 121 12.23 
(No=0)   277 92.03 412 87.10 179 83.26 868 87.77 
2001 
(Yes=1)   25 8.31 65 13.74 40 18.60 130 13.14 
(No=0)   276 91.69 408 86.26 175 81.40 859 86.86 
2002 
(Yes=1)   30 9.97 81 17.12 50 23.26 161 16.28 
(No=0)   271 90.03 392 82.88 165 76.74 828 83.72 
2003 
(Yes=1)   32 10.63 88 18.60 54 25.12 174 17.59 
(No=0)   269 89.37 385 81.40 161 74.88 815 82.41 
2004 
(Yes=1)   38 12.62 102 21.56 68 31.63 208 21.03 
(No=0)   263 87.38 371 78.44 147 68.37 781 78.97 
2005 
(Yes=1)   42 13.95 123 26.00 75 34.88 240 24.27 
(No=0)   259 86.05 350 74.00 140 65.12 749 75.73 
2006 
(Yes=1)   47 15.61 136 28.75 90 41.86 273 27.60 
(No=0)   254 84.39 337 71.25 125 58.14 716 72.40 
 
In order to investigate the operations variable more effectively, we have classified the 23 villages 
into three categories (as mentioned earlier). An interesting observation is released here as we 
notice small category villages are those which have experienced the lowest rates of microcredit 
operations expansion and it is the large category villages where this has been the highest. In the 
year 2000, only in 24 out of a possible 301 of cases of the small villages, there were microcredit 
operations. By the year 2006, this number has increased up to a total of 47 cases out of the 
possible 301 cases. In contrast, there were 36 cases out of a possible 215 cases of large villages 
in 2000. This number increased up to a total of 90 cases by the year 2006. So we see that the 
numbers of operations are higher for large villages and the pace of expansion is faster. In 
contrast, the numbers of operations are lower for the small villages and the pace of expansion is 
also lower. The medium villages are placed somewhere in between.  
 We examine another record for the performances of the village microfinance market, 
which is the record of the average loan amount disbursed in the village micro credit market 
during the previous year. This lagged performance variable is an indicator of how much vibrant 
is the rural micro credit market. Here the observation is that it is difficult to make comments on 
any particular village category. Within the large village categories, there are villages with only a 
growth of 6.70 per cent over six years of time whereas there is another large village where this 
growth is of 83.91 per cent. The highest growth that has been registered is a medium category 
village with growth figures above 91 per cent. The small category villages have registered 
moderate rates of growth. 
 
Table 12. The variable avglndisblag1 for villages throughout the years 2001 to 2006 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
village 
type growth 
7277.78 7692.31 8064.1 8741.26 7891.67 8000 large 9.92 
9013.72 9645.27 9870.47 11013.89 10465.02 11774.22 large 30.63 
6857.14 7148.94 7723.08 7737.37 8423.66 9239.28 large 34.74 
9780.7 9813 9686.04 9660.55 9711.78 10435.77 large 6.70 
5181.82 5973.45 6709.88 7470.3 8532.49 9529.87 large 83.91 
6297.3 8444.44 7592.59 8582.19 10025.21 11997.22 medium 90.51 
6750 8663.46 8625 9202.9 9231.89 8056.08 medium 19.35 
6880 6920 7375 6034.25 7021.01 8983.43 medium 30.57 
8955.88 10198.72 11077.78 11023.58 9339.42 9969.54 medium 11.32 
5875 7148.94 5909.09 6455.36 6471.26 7301.43 medium 24.28 
6181.82 7939.39 7853.66 7631.58 6687.5 7203.54 medium 16.53 
6800 6304.35 7156.25 7000 8179.1 9180.18 medium 35.00 
6186.04 6740 7692.31 7981.93 7714.26 8750.7 medium 41.46 
8521.74 8529.33 9768.68 8778.23 9299.9 11546.13 medium 35.49 
9800 10564.1 9644.44 11298.25 11555.56 13915.18 medium 41.99 
7814.81 8382.35 9403.53 9067.23 9239.26 10838.27 medium 38.69 
7687.5 9625 8352.94 8750 8423.08 9549.02 small 24.21 
9200 9757.58 10256.41 10120 11178.12 11417.91 small 24.11 
6166.67 6777.78 6833.34 8750 9650 9275.86 small 50.42 
5607.14 6243.24 6738.09 6283.02 6244.19 7548.87 small 34.63 
6647.06 6043.48 5560 6675.67 7973.21 8027.78 small 20.77 
0 0 4666.67 6166.67 6833.33 6708.33 small   
7666.66 7812.5 7882.35 9791.67 11161.29 12000 small 56.52 
 
 From the above discussion, we can infer that MFIs do have a tendency to concentrate in 
generally larger villages in terms of activeness and prospects of the local microcredit market. We 
can keep this factor in our model selection while we try to construct econometric specifications.  
 
Section 6.2 Econometric Specifications 
We specify a random effects probit specification for our discussion. We have a balanced panel of 
short time span. Every year an MFI decides whether to operate in a particular location (village) 
or not. If the decision is yes, then we have the dependent variable “yesno” value taking one, and 
zero otherwise. We try to determine the factors behind this zero or one. 
 
The panel data probit model specifies the following model: 
P(yit=1| xi, ci)= P(yit=1| exit, ci)= Ф (xit β + ci), t=1,……………,T5  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… (1) 
-- here ci is the unobserved effect and xi contains xit for all t (see Wooldridge (2002)). The basic 
assumption of this model of unobserved effects probit model under strict exogeneity assumption 
is that the set of explanatory variables xit is strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved 
effect ci; once ci’s are controlled for, the only xit  is there in the response probability at time t. 
This assumption basically rules out lagged dependent variables or types of explanatory variables 
whose future movements may depend on the current and future outcomes of y’s.  
An additional assumption is that the outcomes are independent conditional on (xi,ci).: 
Yi1, Yi2, …………………………………, Yi T  are independent conditional on  (xi, ci) 
………………………………………………………………………………. ………….. (2) 
For the unobserved effects probit model, we have to make another assumption about the 
relationship between ci and xi, that is,  
ci| xi ~ Normal (0, σc 2)…… ……………………………………………………………..(3) 
The last assumption implies that ci and xi’s are independent and that ci has a normal distribution. 
This assumption is stronger than simply assuming that ci and xi’s are uncorrelated, or that 
E(ci|xi)=0.  
                                                 
5 Since MFIs typically continue to operate in a locality once they start operations, their decision to operate or not can 
alternatively be viewed as a dynamic panel problem, where current outcomes depend on the realization during the 
past time periods. This alternative specification can turn out to be difficult to interpret, and value addition could 
small in terms of our understanding of the decision making process. Therefore in this exercise we have relied on a 
simpler exposition.   
 Based on the discussions so far, we propose the following specification for our econometric 
exercise.  
[Operate at village:Yes=1, or No=0] (at year t and village-MFI combination vm)=  
β0 +  
β1 [physical distances from bazaar, bank or paved road] + 
β2 [average loan disbursed at the village micro credit market (one year lagged value)] + 
β3 [Herfindahl index for village micro credit member market (one year lagged value)] +  
β4 [target covered of the potential micro credit borrower market (one year lagged value)] + 
β5 [if any large MFI were present (during the last year), dummy variable] +  
β6 [if any small MFI were present (during the last year), dummy variable] + 
β7 [large village, dummy] + 
β8 [medium village, dummy] + 
β9 [dummy for year 2001] +   
β10 [dummy for year 2002] + 
β11 [dummy for year 2003] +  
β12 [dummy for year 2004] + 
β13 [dummy for year 2005] + 
β14 [dummy for year 2006] + 
error term  ……………..……………………………………………………………………..(4) 
   
 Table 13. Estimation Results from Random Effects Probit Estimation 
 
Random Effects Probit Estimation         
  
      
  
Number of Observations: 5805 
   
  
Number of Groups: 
 
989 
   
  
Group Identification:  villngoid 
   
  
Observations per Group:  min:  3 
  
  
  
  
avg.: 5.9 
  
  
  
  
max: 6 
  
  
  
      
  
Wald Chi-square(14):   414.59 
    
  
Prob>Chi-Sq: 0.00 
     
  
  
      
  
Log Likelihood: -1193.40 
    
  
  
      
  
dependent variable:  
    
  
yesno 
      
  
  
      
  
independent variable(s): 
    
  
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error z  Pr>|z| 
disbazar 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.57 0.57 
disbank 
 
-0.15 
 
0.10 
 
-1.61 0.11 
dispakarasta  -0.03 
 
0.28 
 
-0.11 0.91 
vilavglndisblag1*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
2.93 0.00 
hhimemlag1  -0.52 
 
1.20 
 
-0.44 0.66 
targetcoveredlag1 -0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.88 0.38 
ifsmallngolag1 0.17 
 
0.43 
 
0.39 0.70 
largevill *** 
 
1.29 
 
0.54 
 
2.39 0.02 
medvill 
 
0.32 
 
0.38 
 
0.83 0.41 
d2006 ***  
 
3.85 
 
0.83 
 
4.64 0.00 
d2005 *** 
 
3.10 
 
0.53 
 
5.88 0.00 
d2004 *** 
 
2.21 
 
0.34 
 
6.47 0.00 
d2003 *** 
 
1.28 
 
0.26 
 
4.91 0.00 
d2002 *** 
 
0.88 
 
0.22 
 
4.07 0.00 
constant **** 
 
-11.30 
 
0.92 
 
-12.32 0.00 
  
      
  
sigma_u 
 
8.41 
 
0.35 
  
  
 rho 
 
0.99 
 
0.00 
  
  
  
      
  
Likelihood-ratio test of rho-o: chibar(2) (01): 3233.31 
 
  
Prob.> Chi-sq bar (2): 0.000 
 
Joint significance test of  
disbazar, disbank and 
dispakarasta (chi-sq (3) at 2.67 
and p-value at 0.45) 
 
Joint significance test of  
largevill and medvill (chi-sq (2) at 
6.64 and p-value at 0.04)           
Note: **** implies statistically significant at 1% level, ** implies statistically significant at 5% level and 
* implies statistically significant at 10% level.  
   
Table 14. Marginal Effects (at Mean) from Random Effects Probit Estimation 
Random Effects Probit Estimation (Marginal Effects at Mean after Estimation) 
  
      
  
dependent variable:  
    
  
yesno 
      
  
  
      
  
independent variable(s): 
    
  
Variable 
 
Coefficient Stan. Error z  Pr>|z| X-bar   
disbazar 
 
0.03 0.06 0.57 0.57 4.01   
disbank 
 
-0.15 0.10 -1.61 0.11 2.47   
dispakarasta  -0.03 0.28 -0.11 0.91 0.45   
vilavglndisblag1*** 0.00 0.00 2.93 0.00 8393.57   
hhimemlag1  -0.52 1.20 -0.44 0.66 0.19   
targetcoveredlag1 -0.01 0.01 -0.88 0.38 41.53   
ifsmallngolag1D 0.17 0.43 0.39 0.70 0.96   
largevill D,*** 
 
1.29 0.54 2.39 0.02 0.22   
medvill D 
 
0.32 0.38 0.83 0.41 0.49   
d2006 D,***   
 
3.85 0.83 4.64 0.00 0.17   
d2005 D,***  
 
3.10 0.53 5.88 0.00 0.17   
d2004 D,*** 
 
2.21 0.34 6.47 0.00 0.17   
d2003 D,*** 
 
1.28 0.26 4.91 0.00 0.16   
d2002 D,*** 
 
0.88 0.22 4.07 0.00 0.16   
                
Note: **** implies statistically significant at 1% level, ** implies statistically significant at 5% level and 
* implies statistically significant at 10% level. And the superscript notation D is for dy/dx for a discrete 
change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 Section 6.3 Econometric Results 
We notice that the panel data probit estimation results are as expected (see Table 13 and 14). The distance 
variables (distance from the bank, from the bazaar and from the paved road (pucca rasta)) did not register 
that much of a difference in terms of statistical significance in the MFI’s decision regarding starting of 
operations or not. A plausible explanation for this is that the physical distance variables are being taken 
care of by some other variables such as a large village or a medium category village, so one thing that we 
find it that the physical distance variables did not register that much statistical significance. We 
nonetheless assume that the physical characteristics do play some role in MFI’s decision to enter and 
operate or not. Yet one can argue that since these characteristics do not change over time, they do not 
have much to offer as explanations for MFIs to decide to operate or not. The joint significance test results 
of variables distances from banks, bazaars and paved roads also did not exhibit statistical significance. 
The only point that is to be noticed is that the “distance from the bank” variable is close to significant at 
near to 10% level. And the interesting finding is that the further away from a bank, the lower is the 
likelihood of an MFI to operate in that particular village over time, this controlling for other variables and 
time dummies within the panel data random effects framework.  
 The most prominent result that emerges is that the likelihood of an MFI to operate in a village is 
larger, the larger was the amount of average loan disbursed in the village microcredit market during the 
previous year. We can infer that the average loan disbursed is the key variable that contains the most 
important news of the village micro credit market in a summary form. An average loan amount disbursed 
is actually a bargaining outcome out of both the demand side for credit and the supply side of credit.  
 
Table 15. Average Loan Disbursed of a Village Micro credit Market-- A Hypothetical Construct 
 
                             Interest                                                               S* 
                              Rate                                                                        S 
                                                                                     
                                                                                      A*     
                                                                                 
                                                                             A 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            D* 
                                                                                                       D 
 
 
                                                                                                                            loan amount 
                                                                                                                 disbursed 
 
(In Table 15, we draw a hypothetical demand curve for credit and a supply curve of credit in a 
village microcredit market. The “price” in this market is the (nominal) interest rates being 
charged for microcredit loans and the “quantity” demanded and supplied is the amount of loan 
amount that is being disbursed. Suppose that initially, the equilibrium point in the market is at 
point A, at this point, we have a combination of the number of interest rates being charged and 
the amount of loan being disbursed. Now if there is an increase in the amount of loan disbursed, 
this implies that either the demand curve for loan amount has shifted rightward, or the supply of 
loan amount has shifted leftward, in other words, either the demand for loan has increased over 
time in this specific village market, or the supply of loan has decreased. For an outside observer 
MFI taking time to decide whether to enter this market or not, a higher amount loan amount is 
probably an indication that there is a larger capacity of loan disbursement in this village 
compared to other villages, and thus this is a good location to start operations. We can argue that 
the MFI may actually observe not only the average loan amount disbursed in only one time 
period, but rather may observe over a number of years in order to have a better assessment of the 
market).   
The estimation results did not find much statistical significance for variables such as the 
market concentration index (one year lag) or the target of the potential member market that has 
been covered (one year lag). Neither was it found to be significant that whether small MFIs 
already started their business earlier in the market or not. Almost all villages had had large MFIs 
operating during the previous year, so the dummy variable whether the large MFI was operating 
or not was turning out to be much closer to constant term, so the regression analysis did not take 
this variable.  
A different set of variables have turned out to be quite important in terms of MFI’s 
decision to operate or not. That is the set of dummies: the dummy for a large village, the dummy 
for the medium village and the dummy for a small village. We find that a typical MFI has a 
tendency to operate in a large village, holding other variables constant, and this is a panel data 
probit setup. For example, marginal effects estimation tells us that if the village is a large village, 
there is a 1.29% higher probability that a typical MFI will operate in that village in a particular 
year, holding for all other variables and the unobserved effects constant (this is in comparison to 
a village of small size). Similarly as compared to a small village, there is a 0.32% of higher 
probability that a medium village will have a typical MFI operation. The two village size 
variables such as the largevill and the medvill have been found to be statistically jointly 
significant at the 5% level.  
The year dummies have turned out to be highly statistically significant; all these areas 
compared to the base year(s) of 2000 and 2001. The joint statistical significance test of five year 
dummies such as 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 have come up with a value of 56.36 (value of 
chi-sq (5)) and a p-value of 0.00. For example, as compared to the bases of 2000 and 2001, there 
is a 3.85% higher probability that a typical village will have a particular MFI operation (village 
and MFI combination) going on in that village by the year 2006. This signifies that MFI 
operations are rapidly expanding over time, and this is being captured in the high values of 
coefficients for time dummies.  
 
Section 7: Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we study in detail the data from the Pathrail union, one of the earlier locations of 
microcredit operations. The objective of the examination was to understand the decision-making 
process of microfinance institutions with regards to their entry and proliferation decisions in 
particular localities.  
We find evidence that MFIs, small and large alike, do have a tendency to locate 
themselves in localities which they deem to be economically more perspective in some 
measurement, such as the location may be the centre of economic activities themselves or 
potential market for microfinance is larger, etc. In addition to this, there has been a strong 
tendency for MFIs to expand in recent times, which is evident in prime locations such as in 
Pathrail union.  
An additional point we find is that there has been a rapid proliferation of small, local 
MFIs in recent years. In most of the cases, the small MFIs have a tendency to wait to observe 
how the other players are operating in the market. The small MFIs have not exhibited much 
tendency to experiment much on their own, at least this is the observation that we find in the 
Pathrail data. The common tendency for the small MFIs is to enter a village where there are 
already some big MFIs who have operated for a number of years, so the small ones are 
economizing on information collection cost by observing the large one’s behaviour pattern.  
In contrast, large MFIs have typically started out in these regions a long time ago and so there is 
little scope for proliferation for them for now. In recent times the large MFIs have expanded only 
selectively to some new localities. The data reveals that their location decision may not be much 
dependent on observing other players’ behaviour, rather than a common rule to bring under 
coverage the remaining areas of the locality. For both categories of MFIs, the common tendency 
is to operate in more prospective localities, mostly ignoring the less prospective regions.  
There is a cause of concern for the microfinance industry in Bangladesh. Even though 
there has been a proliferation of MFIs in recent times in the market, which is encouraging since a 
large number of players are now offering a large number of products, there is still a strong 
tendency that economically less prospective regions are not being covered. This evidence is even 
more remarkable since we have examined data from a densely populated (microfinance market-
wise) locality with very long traditions and as such still, there are pockets of locations which 
have been ignored by the microfinance institutions.  
Therefore we may infer that microfinance institutions cannot be fully relied on as simply 
poverty reduction instruments and they will be careful of their own financial sustainability (or 
some would simply say profits). On their own as long as the profit motive is strong the MFIs 
would continue to ignore remote areas or economically less prospective areas. In order to address 
the situation, special incentives have to give to the MFIs to expand their operations in 
economically backward regions.  
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Annex 
 
Annex Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used for the Econometrics Exercise 
Variable Observation Mean 
Std. 
deviation Min. Max. 
yesno 6923 0.19 0.39 0 1 
disbazar 6923 4.21 3.18 0.25 13 
disbank 6923 2.48 1.87 0 9 
dispakarasta 6923 0.49 0.59 0 2 
vilavglndisblag1 5934 8244.92 1969.11 0 13915.18 
hhimemlag1 5805 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.55 
targetcoveredlag1 5934 40.72 23.04 0 104.35 
ifsmallngolag1 5934 0.94 0.23 0 1 
ifbigngolag1 5934 0.99 0.12 0 1 
largevill  6923 0.22 0.41 0 1 
 medvill  6923 0.48 0.50 0 1 
d2006 6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
d2005  6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
d2004 6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
d2003  6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
d2002  6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
d2001  6923 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 
